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INTRODUCTION
projects and appraisal of the converse issue of projects or
policies which would reduce the amount of water used for
crop irrigation. Next I discuss the improvement in the
technical aspects of measuring direct economic benefits of
new supplies, and the co unterpart: foregon e benefits of
water removed. Finally, I take up the potential role of
irrigation develop ment as a source o f econo mic growth in
arid-regio n econo mies.

Federal and state policies regarding water have long been
a major source of contention in the western United States
(U.S.). Irrigation of agricultural crops accounts for 8090percent of water c onsum ed in the western United
States, and much of the discussion has focu sed on th e role
of irrigated agriculture in the regional economy and on
justification of public investments in agricultural water
supply. Economists have had an increasing role in the
debate over w hether w ater supp ly investm ents mainly for
irrigation are in the larger public inte rest.

ECONOMIC APPRAISAL OF WATER SUPPLY
PROJECTS AND POLICIES

T hree economic axioms co ncernin g irrigatio n
development are comm only espou sed by citizens and their
political represen tatives in the a rid western U.S. T hese
propositions are: that introduction of irrigated agriculture
assures rural economic development, consisting of: (1)
significant additional profits, income, and jobs on farms;
and corollaries, (2) a high socia l rate of return to public
capital investment; and (3) large spinoff employment and
business activity in nearby communities. These three
expected consequences of ample irrigation water
supplies–combined with the belief that irrigated
agriculture helps create the self-sufficient local
communities sought by Jefferson–have served to justify
public subsidies to irrigation.
Conversely, loss of
irrigation water supplies from depletion of nonrenewing
ground water stocks o r from transferring water from
agriculture to growing c ities is seen as imposing large
costs on regio n of origin economies. The “iron triangle”
of local interest groups (including native American tribes),
federal agencies, and congressional representatives
transformed these three theses into p ublic appropriations
and subsidies for irrigation water projects or for
alternative urban water supply sources to protect existing
agricultur al regions.

System atic comparison of the estima ted bene fits with the
estimated costs of federal water projects has been required
for many years, provisions in the Reclamation Act of
1902 being an early example. However, methods of
evaluation were crude by present-day standards, often
consis ting only of com parisons of exp ected gross
revenues received by beneficiaries with expected total
proje ct costs. Associated costs to be neficiaries and
foregone benefits from what we would now call
nonmarketed goods and services got little or no attention.
In the early part of the 20 th century, e conom ists (initially
in England) began to formulate the methods of normative
econo mic analysis that came to be known as welfare
econom ics. The well-known requirement in the Flood
Control Act of 1936 that benefits “to whomsoever they
may accrue” must exceed the costs established welfare
economics as the concep tual basis for feasibility tests on
federal water pro jects and set t he stage for later
development and refin emen t of benef it-cost evaluation
techniqu es.

Developing, refining, and applying methods for testing the
above three propositions have been the focus of most of
my career as a water economist. In what follows, I offer
a personal view point on these econom ic issues that rela te
to federal and state water poli cies in the west. The first
topic is the econ omic ev aluation o f irrigation w ater supp ly

By the late 1940s a few scholars, mainly working in the
“land economics” tradition of agricultural economics, had
studied issues relating to water allocation, and worked out
methods of estimating economic benefits and costs.
Several reports on evaluation metho dology were is sued
from within the federal government, most notably the

The Evolution of Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) Applied
to Water Resources Planning
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federal approa ch to cou nting reg ional secondary economic
effects (pecuniary externalities) as benefits to the nation,
arguing that excep t in a few sp ecial cases, su ch imp acts
were offset by foregone secondary costs elsewhere in the
econo my an d thus w ere appr opriately ig nored.

Green Book (Proposed Practices for Eco nomic Analysis
of River B asin Projects, 1950). However, it was not u ntil
the late 1950s when some of the growing number of
resource econom ists began to rigorously adapt
microe conom ic and we lfare econ omics co ncepts to public
investment and allocation issues relating to water. These
economists brought seve ral relatively simple con cepts –
such as oppo rtunity cos ts, deman d as willin gness to
pay, marginal analysis, nonmarketed costs and benefits,
and distinctions between private and social benefits and
costs – to the economic evaluation of water allocation
issues, but major changes in policy were im plied. M y
own introduction to these ideas was from the writings of
Hirshleifer, DeHaven ,and Milliman (196 0), who argued
in their analysis of water planning issues in Ca lifornia that
the least cost app roach am ong av ailable eco nomic ally
feasible alternative water supply sources should be
selected. While Hirshleifer, et al., were not the first to do
so, they further urged consideration of nonstructural
approaches to water supply problems, in particular,
reallocation from low-v alued to higher-v alued uses.
Several other works on water economics appearing about
that time were extremely influential with younger
researchers such as myself. Otto Eckstein’s Water
Resources Development and Rolan d McK ean’s Efficiency
in Government Through Systems Analysis (both appearing
in 1958) provided expositions and critiques of the
practices then current in fede ral evaluation proc edures.
To one raised with the western ethos of “mo re water is
better,” but newly imbued with econom ic concepts, these
works w ere extrao rdinarily illum inating an d exciting .

Several other major messages emerged from these
writings. One premise was that water should be treated as
an economic commodity and that suitably adapted
exchange institutions warranted consideration as
mechanisms for water allocation. An important insight
was that underpriced water resources created an artificial
demand for water in urban and industrial, as well as
agricultural uses, implying that wha t were w idely
perceived as important water “needs” were better
understood as merely wants for cheap water. Full cost
pricin g (perhaps implemented with an increasing block
rate structure) was proposed as an appr opriate solution to
many artificially created “water shortage” problem s.
Water withdrawal h as an opportu nity cost elsewhere in a
river basin, one th at is not register ed on n ew pro jects
unless formal policy efforts ensu re it. Another important
lesson was that econ omic b enefits are n ot autom atic. For
irrigation projects, tangible demand or willingness to pay
must be present, based o n climate, soils, input supp lies,
and markets for products. Water demand is subject, as are
other comm odities, to dim inishing re turns as the sites with
the most suitable conditions are exploited.

MEASURING DIRECT AND FOREGONE
ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF WATER

At the same time, John Krutilla an d Eckste in (Mult iple
Purpose River Basin Development, 1958) emphasized the
physical interdepe ndenc e of wate r projects w ithin a basin
framew ork, and the fact that water development had an
oppor tunity cost value in alternative uses in the typical
case of an already developed river basin , costs that sho uld
be routinely taken into a ccount in projec t appraisals.
(This last point seems difficult to get across. Even now,
the Bureau of Re clamatio n’s recen tly revised fe asibility
study of the Animas-La Plata Project in southwest
Colorado gave no consider ation to for egone hydroe lectric
power and oth er instream benefits linked to consumptive
losses from the project, although analysis done with my
colleagues indicates that the foregone energy benefits
from downstream dams such as Glen Canyon and Hoover
will easily exceed the direct irrigation benefits gained
from the proposed investment.) Other writers urged the
importance of being clear as to the “accounting stance” –
the point of view from w hich the e conom ic feasibility
analysis is conducted. If federal monies were to finance
the project, a national point of view is appropriate for
calculating benefits and costs. In this vein, b oth Eck stein
and McKean vigorously challenged the then conventional

Most uses of water supply are nonmarketed, so estimates
of econom ic benefits must be done by synthetic methods
rather than observing market pri ces. The story of the
development and impro vement in tech niques for
measuring benefits of nonmarketed natural resource and
environmental goods is well known and documented in
numerous books and articles. Advances in theory,
econometric techniques, and data collection methods have
combined to greatly improve the reliability and
acceptab ility of estimates of nonm arket benefits. The
majority of that effort has been directed to methods of
valuing environmental public goods from the perspective
of the consumer and the household, and most of the
literature reflec ts that emp hasis.
However, most withdrawal and consumption of water
occurs for use by private, p rofit-makin g entities – in
irrigated agricultu re, and to a much lesser exten t in
industry. Improving methods for evalu ating ben efits for
these “producers’ goods” has been one of my primary
interests, so I em phasize th is aspect.
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the residual technique requires a number of careful
forecasts o n the part o f the analy st. These inc lude:

Measu ring Dire ct Irrigation B enefits
My reintroduction to the subject of valuing irrigation
water came as soon as I began work at the University of
Arizona since that subject was a primary purpose of the
research effort. Eventually this interest led to personal
involvement with western w ater p olicy co n flic ts . M y
colleague Bill Martin and I were asked to serve in a
consulting capacity to do a quick econ o m ic appraisal of
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s (USBR) proposed
Central Arizona Project for the State of Arizona. The
project was designed to transport water from the Colorado
River in western Arizona to the Phoenix-Tucson area for
the purpose of replacing ground water withdrawals from
aquifers, which were being quickly depleted by pumping
for crop irriga tion; and also to supply e xpected rapid
growth in the urban areas (and no t to be disreg arded, to
put Arizona’s Colorado River water rights to beneficial
use before C alifornia could claim them). The Bureau of
Reclamatio n analysts had found the project to be
econo mically feasible.
However, the cycle of
congressional politics of the day was not favorable to the
project, and chance s for federa l funding for it appeare d to
fading. The state government wan ted an estimate of the
econo mic returns to the huge investm ent and o f the ability
of prospective beneficiaries (prim arily agricu ltural) to
repay p rinciple an d interest on the investm ent.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Which crops will be produced?
What will be their productivity?
What will be their quality and selling prices?
What technology of production will be employed?
What level of inputs, including water, will be used?
And what will be the prices of inputs?

W e disagreed with their methods on both the revenue and
cost sides of the e quation , conclud ing their estim ates of
revenues were too high, and their estimates of costs too
low. The resid ual techn ique is extre mely sen sitive to
small variations in assumptions about either the nature of
the production function or about prices. A sm all
systema tic error in eithe r costs or revenu es is multiplie d in
the size of the residua l. I have no w com e to believe that
m any systematic biases which inflate net benefits are
likely to oc cur in irriga tion appr aisal wheth er in the U.S.
or elsewhere in the world (Young, 1996). Some typical
biases are discussed below using the Central Arizona
Project Analysis as the case ex ample. On the cost side,
the typical problem is with underestimation or even
omission of certain e lements of costs. Omission of costs
or opportunity costs of any productive input in effect
credits the prod uctivity of that inpu t to the value of water.
One continuing issue has been an inadequate accounting
for the costs of labor. Bureau of Reclamation procedures
did not recog nize the o pportun ity cost of family work ers,
the most important source of labor on the small farms the
bureau anticipated would be the major users of project
water supplies. Another major cost issue was the
accounting for costs of moving water from the main canal
to the actual farm sites where it would b e used. In th is
instance such cos ts would be quite larg e, and w e felt the
USBR estimates g ave in adequate attention to these
necessary expenditures. O ften in residual analyses, no
charge for the op portunity cost of land is taken, ag ain
credit ing the productivity of that resource to water. On
the revenue side, two major problems are encountered.
The most sign ificant is related to the projections of
yields, prices, and therefore revenu es. USBR used partial
equilibrium proced ures to fore cast gene rous gro wth in
yields, but neglected to consider the likely adverse
aggreg ate effects on market price of such output increases.
The history of agricultural commodity prices has been a
decline in real terms as a result of technological advance,
so a more realistic appro ach wo uld acco unt for like ly
changes in both prices and productivity. Also, to the
extent that agricultural commodity prices are subsidized
by federal policy, such prices are overstatements of the
value to the nation of the commod ities, and therefore
overestim ate from the national point of view the derived
value of irrigation water. A fina l revenue issue is an

Estimates of the eco nomic benefits of irrigation
develop ments were then, as now, derived m ainly by the
“residual” approach.
Yields and productive input
requirem ents of crop production are forecast for each year
of the appropriate planning period and, with assumptions
on product and input prices, converted into monetary
terms. Economic bene fits attributable to water are
calculated as the net income remaining after all non water
production costs are deducted from estimated reven ues.
With an analysis based on Bureau of R eclamation
estimates of costs, together with data and methods that we
had developed over the previous few years, we soon
concluded that the net pro ject direct be nefits wo uld be far
from sufficient fo r agricultur al water us ers to be ab le to
repay much o f the investmen t costs. Appalled and
dumbfounded by our conclusions and perhaps irritated by
our flip com ment th at the state wo uld be ec onom ically
better off to pay California to take the water, the client
rejected our repo rt, presum ably to find analysts who better
understood the prob lem of w ater supp ly in an arid region.
Assuming that someone would be interested in our
findings, we published them in a University of Arizona
business college periodical, to an enormously greater
criticism fro m the w ater establishm ent.
How did Martin’s and my procedures differ fro m those
employed by the USBR? From the formu la, it is clear that
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on capital, to profits, and any im ported from outside the
region. The m ethod y ielded ve ry large estim ates of the
econo mic value of water, particularly in industrial uses.
Although the value-added approach appears, at first
glance, to be similar to the residual method described
earlier, it differs in certain key respects. It is now
recognized that unless extra care is taken, the method
overstates the correct economic value of water as an
interme diate good (Y oung, 1996). From the residual
formu la described in the prec eding sec tion it can be seen
that the conc ept repres ents the payments to a larger set of
inputs than just to water. The returns to water are but a
part of value added. Employing the value-added measure
generates very large estimates o f benefits by erron eously
attributing the payments to all inputs as the value of water.

overem phasis on the potential for specialty vegetable and
fruit production, favored by irrigation proponen ts because
such products appear to generate a high return over
operating costs and employ large amounts of labor.
However, the high gross margins of specialty crops are
misleading – representing a return not only to water, but
to the high m arket a nd pro duction risks and the
entrepreneurial skills inherent in specialty crop
production. Moreo ver, specia lty crops ra rely account for
more than a small fraction (less than one-fifth) of irrigated
acreage in the west, so from a national perspective there
is no reason to assume that federal incentives are needed
to protect against shortag es of fruits and vege tables.
Adopting the cautious approach to measuring irrigation
benefits outlined above yields few cases of positive net
econo mic benefits to irrigation developm ent proposals.
Most prospec tive irrigation proje cts will be rela tively
expensive to build and will not have the advantage of the
best soils and climate; the most attractive sites have
already b een dev eloped.

PUBLIC IRRIGATION WATER INVESTMENTS
AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH
The third thesis mentioned at the outse t was that pu blic
water projects – particularly those developing new
irrigated lands in arid and sem iarid areas – create regional
econo mic growth. The federal reclamation program
beginning early in the twen tieth century was premised on
this idea and Frankli n Roosevelt’s program for moving
the economy out of the great depression contained a
significant role for w ater resou rces deve lopme nt. This
final section briefly presents ev idence an d argum ents
which suppor t an alternativ e policy c onclusio n: that
irrigation develop ment m ay be a less than idea l place to
invest scarce public cap ital, and that su ch investm ents
would best be assessed with the pub lic taxpaye r–who will
finance the expe nditure– in mind, and no t uncritically
assuming these invest m ents automatically to be in the
public inte rest.

Enough time has elapsed that the alternative analytic
approaches have been given the test of experience. The
Central Arizona Project was funded and completed. Even
though the water c harges w ere highly subsidized , the
actual net incom es to man y farme rs was insu fficient to
pay the minimal cost-sharing requirements. Even at this
writing, much of the water delivery capacity remains
unused. The USBR has allocated much of the capac ity to
Native American tribes (because, cynics would say,
federal law doe s not requ ire tribes to reimburse the
government for any capital expenditures). However, the
tribes have not received much project water. Similar
stories of unec onom ical irrigation p rojects are fo und in
other recently com pleted projects. The Navajo Irrigation
Proje ct ,serving a portion of the Navajo Reservation in
north western New M exico, an d the Do lores proje ct in
southwestern C olorado, are exa mples.

On the General Role of Natural Resources Development
as a Sour ce of W ealth

Derivin g Wa ter Bene fits From Region al Econ omic
Mod els

Because irrigation development is a special case of the
general problem of natural resource develop ment, it will
be useful to tak e a quick look at t he general econo mic
literature on regional e conom ic grow th.

The “value-added ” metho d to estima ting econ omic
benefits of producers’ goods is another measure ment issue
which occupied my attention. The method is based on
regional inter-indu stry (also calle d Leon tief input-o utput)
analysis. This was quite popular as a method several
decades ago, particularly by regional econo m ists. What
is termed the value added (or Gross Regional Income) in
an inter-industry model comprises payments to factor
owners in the regio n. Specific ally, it include s paym ents
to: wages a nd salaries fo r the wor k force, re nts paid to
land and other natural resources, interest and depreciation

The simplest and mo st frequently adva nced lay perso ns’
explanation for differen ces in regional e conom ic income,
emplo ymen t, and we alth focuses on disparities in natural
resource endowm ents, including soils, climate, water
supply, minerals, fisheries, and forest resources. Rich
resource endowm ents are seen by most nonspecialists as
the primary sources of wealth; the policy implication
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natural resources. Natural resource constraints do not
seriously lim it econom ic output.

being that public and priv ate investments to ex ploit these
resources are attractive avenues t o ec o n om ic
develop ment.

(Interestingly, the view s of presen t-day no n-econ omists
on the role of natural resources development as a primary
engine of wealth exhibit considerable similarity to ideas
espoused by an early school of economists, the
“Physiocrats” in 18th Century France. The Physiocrats
believed that natu ral resources, particularly agricultural
resources, were the primary basis for wealth. Therefore,
econo mic policy sho uld focus on improving the status of
natural resource-b ased eco nomic activities, wh ich because
of what are now called forward and backward linked
effects, would directly tran slate to enhanced regional and
national economies. The Physiocrats’ views were soon
challenged by mainstream economists – Adam Smit h,
among others – due to the failure to account for the roles
of capital, labor, and technologic advance. How ever,
similar ideas about the role of agriculture in an economy
continue to
be voiced in policy discussions
by
nonspe cialists, particular ly those fro m rural a reas.)

However, for present-day re gional or nationa l econom ies,
there is little evidence to suppo rt the proposition that
natural resource develop ment is a stro ng eng ine for
regional economic growth . It was true, ind eed, at early
stages of econ omic d evelopm ent, the wealthiest and
fastest growing economies were those based on temper ate
climates and abundant resource end owments. How ever,
the supporting data for the hypothesis of natural resource
development as an engine o f regiona l econom ic grow th is
so limited that analysts suc h as Higg ins and S avoie (1995)
devote only a few pages of their definitive volume on
regional econom ic develo pmen t policy to dismissing
natural resource development as a productive avenue for
encou raging re gional ad vancem ent.
This conclusion is justified as follows. The econom ic
wealth of nation s is best enhanced when both public and
private institutions are designed to chann el resourc es into
the areas of the highest return to capital and other
resources (net of direct and external costs). Natural
resources–along with labor and capital–were the initial
factors of production identified by the classical
econom ists. In the early stages of development the supp ly
of the “prod uced” fa ctor (capita l) was limited and
technology was primitive. Under such conditions, natural
resources did account for a significant part of national
output. Neverth eless, in present-day economies, several
considerations have shifted the m ost attractiv e
opportunities from the natural resources arena to other
types of public and private in v e st m ents. In most
countries, investments in natural resource development
have been pursued for many years, and diminishing
returns have long since set in; so few opportunities
typically remain for further high return investments. Even
when developments yielding high returns to the investing
entity are identified, the extractive indu stries freque ntly
bring with them substantia l external (uncompensated third
party) co sts. Such co sts take the form of degraded water
or air quality or adverse effects on nonmarketed
environmental goods and services. When, subsequently,
capital has accumulated, the labor force’s skills have
improved, technology has advanced, and international and
interregio nal trade in bo th financia l capital and produc ts
permit consumption to rise without local self-sufficiency
in all consum ption go ods; natu ral resourc e investm ents
are less profitable from society’s perspective. An
increasing ly recogn ized view , taken to its logical limit by
writers such as Simon (1996), is that physical, and
particularly huma n, capital can readily be substituted for

Irrigation D evelopm ent and R egional E conom ic Grow th
This general thesis of the limited p otential role of natural
resources in region al econo mic growth can also be applied
to the special case of potential irrigation water resources
investments. A number of studies of the role of wate r
investm ents in regional economic growth w ere unable to
find statistically significa nt effects. These findings can be
explained as follows . Food prices were relatively low for
most of the twen tieth centur y. Overcapacity due to capital
investment and technological advance overcame, for most
of the world, the problems of food shortages, so food and
fiber prices in real terms have continued to fall. Th e best
sites (those with least cost of developm ent and highe st
potential productivity) have been long since exploited.
Potential water development sites which remain are
typically less productive and m ore costly to complete than
those projects alre ady in operation. The y may also yield
high external costs to third parties and other projects. (For
example, new water storage may reduce the amount
available to existing downstream reservoirs, a situation
reached some time ago in most river basins in the west).
Labor-saving technological advances in agricultural
production and processing have led to a situation in
which investment in food-producing capacity adds
minim ally to farm and regional emplo ymen t. Only water
resource developments wh ose benefits are highly valued
(such as municipal and industrial water supplies in rapidly
growing regions) are likely to yield a comp etitive rate of
return while still bein g able pay to mitigate environmental
damage s.
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a doctorate in Agricu ltural Econ omics w ith a mino r in
politics and ph ilosophy at Michig an State U niversity in
1963. With ro ots in the wes t, it was natura l to then go to
the Univer sity of Ariz ona prim arily as a researcher on an
early water economics study.
Participation in an
interdisciplinary approach to ground water policy
modeling at Resources for the Future from 1968-1970
cemented my focus on water economics and policy issues,
an emphasis since then continue d at Colo rado State
University.

A conclud ing note: p robably the major shift in the
western wate r policy arena over the years of my
involvement is the shift away from complete dominance
of the withdrawal uses of water in policy decisions,
towards an increa singly important role for instream
environmental and recreational values. The pro gress in
economic analysis has contributed to this shift in two
ways. First, the introduction of more realism and rigor
into the evaluation of water use in private producers’
goods has chang ed the pe rception o f the role of water in
regional economies to a more realistic one. Second, the
evidence on the public’s increased value of environmental
resources together with numerous estimates of significant
public willingness to pay for environmental preservation
have aided in the recognition of those interests in water
policy. Although economic efficiency in allocating water
among off stream and instream uses and water qu ality
have not yet been fully achieved, we can be encouraged
by the degree of progress and prospects for the future.
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Robert A. Young – After completing a degree in applied
agricultural sciences in California in 1954, fulfilling a
military obligation, and working for a time, I completed
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